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“A Small Town with a Pretty Big Idea”: 
How Ames, Iowa, Came to Have the 
Most Enduring Resource Recovery 
Plant in the United States 
ANGIE GUMM 
ON JULY 13, 1979, more than a week after President Jimmy 
Carter had mysteriously disappeared to Camp David, trying to 
discover the root of America’s problems — energy and other — 
the Des Moines Register’s Donald Kaul wrote,  
Two months ago, you hardly ever heard of synthetic fuel; now 
you hear of little else. Congressmen are knocking each other down 
to get in the forefront of those in support of ‘synfuels’ as they are 
called. President Carter is said to be on his way down from the 
mountaintop with a crash program to develop a synthetic-fuels 
industry. It seems to be an idea whose time has come — which is 
a fair indication of what rotten times we live in. Synthetic fuels is a 
rotten idea. It’s the modern version of the medieval search for the 
Philosopher’s Stone, a mythical method of turning lead into gold, 
and about as practical.1  
 
1. Des Moines Register, 7/13/1979. 
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In what came to be known as his “Malaise Speech,” Carter did 
not talk about synthetic fuels. Instead he focused on the crisis of 
confidence America was experiencing at the end of the decade. 
The country that had put a man on the moon exactly ten years 
earlier had grown doubtful of its future thanks to a decade filled 
with political corruption, shortages, excessive consumerism, and 
an onslaught of technological failures, especially in the previous 
year.2 Even though he did not mention it, the president did plan 
a massive funding of synfuel research and development along 
with numerous associated technologies, including over $2 bil-
lion for waste-to-energy efforts.3    
Kaul’s objections to the high-tech fuels, which turned oil 
shale, coal, tar sands, and possibly garbage into oil and gas, 
were shared by environmental groups like the Sierra Club, 
which called the president’s plan a “disaster.”4 To opponents, 
synfuels had the potential to cause environmental harm; used 
too many other precious resources such as water and land; were 
too expensive and risky; and did nothing to encourage volun-
tary conservation, which was the easiest and cheapest way to 
save energy. The meaning of Carter’s support despite all of 
these problems offended environmentalists the most: that en-
ergy production trumped all other concerns about resources 
and the environment.  
That was not the case for most Americans during the 1970s, 
however. A study of the issue of solid waste management re-
veals that most environmental attitudes during that decade were 
not polemical ideologies entrenched at far ends of a spectrum. 
Instead, during the 1970s a wide range of people and groups ac-
cepted the general supremacy of technology and the market but 
believed that they could be guided by a conservationist ethic 
that acted in humanity’s best long-term interests.  
                                                 
2. During the year before the speech, Love Canal was declared a national dis-
aster, Three-Mile Island had its meltdown, Flight 191 crashed, and Skylab was 
about to fall from the sky.  
3. “Federal Programs Impacting Urban Waste Problems,” Carter Presidential 
Staff Offices, Cabinet Secretary Office Ed Helminski, box 190, Urban Waste 
Management/Resource Recovery, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Mu-
seum, Atlanta, Georgia. 
4. “A Time to Choose: Synthetic Fuels and the American Future,” Sierra Club 
National News Report, 7/27/1979.  
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Resource recovery was the embodiment of this cooperative, 
technology-centered environmentalism. Resource recovery plants 
came in a variety of types, but all of them extracted resources 
that could be recycled and sold in the market and converted the 
rest of the waste into some form of energy. By the time Carter un-
veiled his plan, failed and abandoned resource recovery plants 
were sprinkled across many major cities of the United States, 
and the Environmental Protection Agency had decided to drop 
future efforts from its plate. Resource recovery was too high 
tech and expensive, officials had decided. European mass-burn 
facilities, which had fewer parts and produced only energy, 
were simpler, cheaper, and more reliable.  
The goal of turning waste into energy, however, did not win 
over the environmentalists who had accepted the compromises 
of the more conservation-minded resource recovery. Carter’s 
plan was not fully implemented, and many cities abandoned 
their waste-to-energy (WTE) plants when they lost federal sup-
port in the 1980s. In fact, American solid waste management has 
progressed little since the 1970s; by 1995 every state either ex-
ported or imported (or both) waste, and by 2000, 32 million tons 
of trash were being transported from one state to another.5  
Only one of the highly technical resource recovery systems 
would survive from the 1970s to the present day. Ames, Iowa, 
alone has persisted in its resource recovery efforts even in the 
face of high prices and international controversy, all the while 
clinging to old conservationist values that have lost and regained 
popularity through the decades. Iowans’ esteem of farmland 
combined with the city’s acceptance of engineering efforts and 
goals created a unique situation that has enabled the resource 
recovery plant to carry on for all of these years. Its story offers 
a rare case study that shows us the unforeseen issues that can 
emerge when a city not only pursues an alternative energy but 
commits to it.  
In 1973 The American City magazine ran a story titled “Solid- 
Waste Disposal — Five Years to Doomsday.” It compared the 
garbage situation to the “nuclear clock of the atomic scientists 
which warned civilization that only five minutes remained be-
                                                 
5. Martin Melosi, Garbage in the Cities: Refuse, Reform and the Environment (Pitts-
burgh, 2005), 215. 
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When U.S. Representative Tom Harkin testified at a congressional hear-
ing about resource recovery, he agreed with the claim of an advertisement 
taken out by a manufacturer of some of the components of Ames’s resource 
recovery plant: Ames was indeed “a small town with a pretty big idea.“ 
From Saturday Evening Review, 12/13/1975, p. 43
fore extinction.” Should cities simply do nothing because local 
governments cannot reach any consensus, the article asked. 
“The little Iowa city of Ames doesn’t think so,” the author 
wrote. “Ames is unafraid. It has agreed to receive refuse from 
nine other nearby municipalities. It will use this refuse as a fuel 
to generate electricity in its municipally owned power system, 
sulfur free, incidentally.”6 By the time the plant opened, Ames 
was touting itself as a “small town with a pretty big idea.”7  
                                                 
6. William S. Foster, “Solid-Waste Disposal — Five Years to Doomsday,” The 
American City, July 1973, 8. 
7. Tom Harkin, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Environment and the 
Atmosphere of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, 94th Cong, 2nd sess., 4/7/1976, 4/8/1976, 4/12/1976, 4/13/1976, 48.  
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THE IDEA for the plant germinated at a city council meeting 
in October 1971 when councilman Ray Fisher suggested that 
Ames look into an “experiment in waste disposal” he had re-
cently seen that might save the city some money.8 Regulations 
against feeding garbage to pigs and the open burning of dumps 
caused municipal solid waste across the country to accumulate 
at greater rates in the 1960s than ever before, as did the nation’s 
affluence. By 1970, the Ames landfill contained 6,000 junked cars, 
the byproduct of a society so rich that it was more likely to throw 
away than to fix up something even as expensive as a car. Even 
after the city removed the vehicles, the landfill was expected to 
be full by 1975, so Mayor Stuart Smith assembled a solid waste 
task force to start looking for new sites very early in the decade.9  
A new landfill would have to meet the standards established 
by the recently founded federal Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA). The city estimated that the cost to dispose of trash would 
increase from $1.50 to $2.50 per ton in a regulated landfill. Ames 
was not the only city running out of landfill space. Neighboring 
communities were also out of room and not yet prepared to site 
or fund new landfills. Before hiring the consulting firm of Gibbs, 
Hill, Durham and Richardson in October 1972, Ames had imple-
mented a “stop gap” solution earlier that year, agreeing to take 
all of Story County’s garbage for $3 per ton. It was not surpris-
ing that area leaders readily agreed to the expensive, temporary 
solution. By the middle of the decade, the new regulations and 
increasing environmental awareness would cause most of the 
country’s mayors to declare that solid waste disposal was their 
“number one headache.”10  
The Ames Daily Tribune’s editorial board endorsed Fisher’s 
“experiment,” noting that a new landfill could cause water pol-
lution and would take “enormous amounts of space.”11 The ex-
                                                 
8. Minutes, Ames City Council, 10/19/1971, Ames City Hall, Ames.  
9. Ames Daily Tribune, 11/11/1970; “Ames Pioneers with New Solid Waste Sys-
tem,” Key to the City (City of Ames newsletter), August 1973, 6, Ames Histori-
cal Society, Ames; Iowa State Daily, 5/18/1973. 
10. Iowa State Daily, 5/18/1973; Minutes, Ames City Council, 10/10/1972; 
Ames Daily Tribune, 11/18/1971; Tom Redburn, “The Tug-of-War over Waste,” 
Environmental Action 22 (May 1976), 3–4. 
11. Ames Daily Tribune, 10/22/1971. 
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periment was a resource recovery plant — the great hope for 
solid waste disposal in the late 1960s and 1970s. The EPA spent 
millions of dollars funding demonstration grants for a handful 
of cities to build resource recovery plants that other cities could 
study. Although many local governments were interested in re-
source recovery, it was mostly large cities that actually pursued 
the plants. Even with government aid, the costs were so high 
and the technology so uncertain that municipal solid waste re-
source recovery projects were usually only worthwhile for cities 
that had a lot of people and little available land. 
In Ames, a small city with a rapidly growing population (but 
still under 50,000) and plenty of available land, planners pro-
jected that the disposal fee would be $2.69 per ton with the plant, 
with hopes that it would drop to a mere 60 cents per ton in 
about a decade. Area leaders devised a plan for all participating 
communities to pay the same price, so other Story County com-
munities were getting a small bargain compared to their previ-
ous agreement.12 While Ames had some immediate and local 
reasons to consider resource recovery, a new environmental 
ethic along with the national energy and farmland crises that 
occurred before construction began in October 1973 would be-
come more important than price issues and provide the city 
with lasting justifications for the plant.  
Just as the growing piles of garbage caused Americans to 
worry about pollution and waste in the 1960s, works like Rachel 
Carson’s Silent Spring, Garrett Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Com-
mons,” and Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb, also alerted 
Americans to the threats posed by chemicals and scarcity.13 The 
extent of the country’s environmental concern became apparent 
after the wildly popular first Earth Day on April 22, 1970. Iowans 
were also considering their role in environmental issues during 
this period. When the U.S. Foreign Policy Association issued a 
pamphlet titled “Man and His Environment — What Price Sur-
vival?” the Ames Daily Tribune reported that “scores of Iowa 
programs dealing with this universal challenge are gaining mo-
                                                 
12. Iowa State Daily, 5/18/1973. 
13. Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston, 1962); Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy 
of the Commons,” Science 162 (1968), 1243–48; Paul R. Erlich, The Population 
Bomb (New York, 1971). 
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mentum. The press, radio and television are giving it major play. 
Pastors are emphasizing the Ecological Crisis. Youth are finding 
handles to take hold of in tackling the proposition. Leaders in 
industry are recognizing that ‘the first responsibility of business 
is to operate for the well-being of society.’”14  
Ames was certainly no exception to this evolving environ-
mental consciousness. The local paper was full of articles about 
environmental issues and even featured a series on world hun-
ger. In October 1971 alone, two speakers came to Ames to dis-
cuss population and the earth’s carrying capacity. One of the 
speakers, agricultural expert and former Iowa State University 
(ISU) student and professor William C. Paddock, visited his alma 
mater to warn about the pending food crisis. Paddock said that 
a food crisis in 20 or 30 years was “unavoidable.”15
Paddock’s worry was also a political concern in the early 
1970s. When famine hit desperate countries around the globe, 
seeming to offer proof of the pending environmental calamity, 
U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz encouraged farmers to 
grow as much as possible, reversing a decades-long policy of dis-
couraging agricultural overproduction, dating back to the Great 
Depression. The United States could profit from the exports eco-
nomically and, by providing aid to the Soviet Union in the cold 
war climate, could display technological one-upmanship. On the 
other hand, as historian Tim Lehman has noted, concerns about 
soil erosion and fuel shortages became prevalent just as farmers 
were being called upon to feed the world. “This volatile mixture 
of political, economic, demographic, and environmental change,” 
he writes, formed the backdrop for a serious “attempt to plan for 
the use of American farmland.”16 In light of the growing needs 
and tightening constraints, it seemed foolish and wrong to turn 
good farmland over to garbage. 
Another of the decade’s serious problems, the energy crisis, 
began in 1973, just as construction of the Ames resource recov-
ery plant started. A substantial portion of the city’s energy came 
                                                 
14. Ames Daily Tribune, 10/8/1971.  
15. Ames Daily Tribune, 10/12/1971, 10/29/1971. 
16. Tim Lehman, Public Values, Private Lands: Farmland Preservation Policy, 1933–
1985 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1995), 44. 
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from coal, while the crisis was linked to the 1973–1974 oil em-
bargo. But as other cities and states also started switching to 
coal, the fact that Iowa imported about 98 percent of its energy 
from other states became more of an issue, especially when the 
price of coal jumped 50 percent from 1974 to 1976.17 Promoters 
of the Ames resource recovery plant offered the energy crisis as 
further justification that the plant ought to be built. Researchers 
hoped that Ames would be an example to the rest of the state of 
the potential to use waste for fuel, and many believed that the 
state might become completely energy self-sufficient by turning 
agricultural waste into energy.18  
One of those true believers was state senator and poultry 
farmer Hilarius Heying. When Heying received notice that his 
Dyersville gas supply was in jeopardy in 1974, he teamed up 
with a Des Moines company called Sunny Time Energy to turn 
the manure from his farm’s 160,000 chickens into a continuous 
supply of energy for his farm. The $75,000 system, called POOP 
4, received a $50,000 grant from the state energy department 
council. ISU professors offered to work with Heying to develop 
a five-year plan of study of the conversion of methane to energy. 
Like most alternative energy efforts of the 1970s, mechanical 
difficulties caused the plant to fail, and it lost its government 
funding.19 Heying unsuccessfully continued to push the state to 
invest in turning waste — of all sorts — into energy. He asked his 
colleagues in the state senate to picture that “every community 
could be self-sustaining if all the hidden energy in our wastes 
were frugally recycled. I have made a couple of years study of 
this — I have spent some fifty thousand dollars for worthless 
                                                 
17. Iowa State Daily, 12/13/1973; Public Power (official publication of the Amer-
ican Public Power Association), September–October 1974, 28; Changing Scene 
(newsletter of the Ames Laboratory), vol. 2, no. 89, p. 1, Special Collections, 
Iowa State University (ISU) Library, Ames. 
18. Changing Scene, vol. 2, no. 89, p. 1. 
19. Larry Murphy, “Methane Making Electricity at West Union,” undated clip-
ping from the Des Moines Register in Hilarius Heying Papers, MS 250, Special 
Collections, ISU Library, Ames; R. J. Smith, assistant professor, Iowa State Uni-
versity, to Senators T. Riley and H. L. Heying, 4/19/1974, ibid. An article by 
George Anthan, “The Ingenious Iowan: Beer Cans, Chicken Droppings Pro-
vide Energy,” in the Des Moines Register, 5/12/1980, describes some of the so-
lar, wind, and battery-powered energy-saving efforts of the decade.  
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equipment, but I have learned a great deal. Now that we are run-
ning out of landfills and now that the sewage is creeping up from 
the ocean bed onto our eastern and western seashores, we must 
be motivated to action.”20  
Because most state and local governments could not, how-
ever, afford to finance experimental energy projects, the federal 
government began funding resource recovery demonstration 
programs. The goal was to let one city learn from and tinker with 
the technological mishaps that would inevitably arise with any 
plant scale-up, so that other communities could invest in tech-
nology that was no longer experimental.21 As all of the demon-
stration plants failed by the end of the 1970s and the federal gov-
ernment began the switch to European-style waste-to-energy 
plants, the lesson most cities took away was not to invest in 
resource recovery. The city of Ames had jumped on the band-
wagon early, however, before some of the demonstration plants 
were even funded, let alone failed. The city surveyed several 
resource recovery systems and decided to model its on the first 
demonstration plant, the St. Louis-Union Electric plant, which 
began operating in 1972.   
In the St. Louis system, a hammer shredded municipal solid 
waste (MSW) that was then fed into an air separator. The heavy 
material, which usually was non-combustible, dropped down 
to a magnetic belt and was separated into ferrous and non-
ferrous materials that would be recycled or sent to a landfill. 
The lighter material went into a “cyclone separator,” where it 
was separated once more. The remaining MSW, the light mate-
rial, was stored and then packed into semi trucks, which hauled 
the waste to a Union Electric power plant, where it could be 
fired with coal to provide energy for the city. The product was 
called refuse-derived fuel (RDF). This process was the most ap-
pealing to the city of Ames, which hoped to build its facility 
near its municipally owned power plant and install a pneumatic 
tube to transfer the waste. The full-sized St. Louis plant was 
never built because Union Electric backed out after difficulties 
                                                 
20. Senator Hilarius Heying, speech for state senate about Senate File #1126, 
Hilarius Heying Papers. 
21. Angie Gumm, “Looking for the Good in Garbage: Bill Compton Builds 
Wichita a Pyrolysis Plant,” Kansas History 31 (2008),  216.  
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siting transfer stations and new laws regarding utility research 
and development made the plant unaffordable, according to 
the company.22 The Ames plant was unusual in that it was to be 
owned and operated by the city rather than a utility or technol-
ogy company. Consequently, it would never be subject to the 
whims or economic needs of a private corporation that had to 
answer to stockholders.  
Upon the recommendation of the consulting firm, the city 
proceeded with the RDF plant and put out calls for bids for the 
plant’s numerous parts in 1973. The initial expected cost was 
$2.8 million, which would be funded primarily through general 
obligation bonds that did not require a vote by citizens. The 
plant apparently had plenty of local support, however. Mayor 
Stuart Smith considered the plant one of his highest priorities, 
and City Manager J. R. Castner claimed, “In nearly 25 years in 
local government I’ve never been involved with a project that 
everyone in town thinks is the greatest thing that has come 
down the tube since the toothbrush. People stop me on the 
street and at cocktail parties to ask how the plant is coming 
along and when they can go through it.”23 The Ames League of 
Women Voters undertook a major study, which supported the 
plant. ISU and the Story County communities that had been 
using the Ames landfill all agreed to 25-year contracts to use 
the Ames plant for all of their solid waste disposal needs. Both 
mayoral candidates and several of the city council candidates 
in 1973 also expressed pride in the plant.24 There is one clue that 
                                                 
22. H. Lanier Hickman Jr., The History of Solid Waste Management in the United 
States (Santa Barbara, CA, 2003), 223–24; L. J. Shannon et al., St. Louis Refuse 
Processing Plant: Equipment, Facility, and Environmental Evaluations (Washington, 
DC, 1975), 5, 8; Daniel M. Doran, Energy from a Wasted Resource: The Ames Ex-
perience (Ames, 1996), 4. 
23. Ames Daily Tribune, 5/17/1973; J. R. Castner, “The Ames, Iowa Resource 
Recovery Story,” Nation’s Cities, August 1975, 30.  
24. “League of Women Voters Endorses Heat Recovery and Recycling as 
Waste Disposal Methods,” folder 9, box 14, League of Women Voters of Ames 
Records, MS 341, Special Collections, ISU Library; Laura Miller, “Contem-
plating Conservation, Aldo Leopold,” Leopold Letter 21, no. 1 (Spring 1992), 
at  www.leopold.iastate.edu/pubs/nwl/2009/2009-1-leoletter/leopold.html 
(accessed 3/28/2011); Terry V. Sprenkel, “Development of the Ames System—
Incentives to Solve a Problem,” Proceedings of the Solid Waste to Energy Confer-
ence — The Ames Experience (Ames, 1978), 43; Iowa State Daily, 10/25/1973, 
10/26/1973, 11/1/1973. 
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some Ames residents had reservations, however. Council can-
didate Dennis Sweeney, who claimed to base “his opinions en-
tirely on the views of the people in the third ward,” told the 
Iowa Student Public Interest Research Group (ISPIRG), “The 
solid waste disposal program has some good possibilities, but 
not without further research and a Federal funding program.”25 
That is the only negative comment about the plant found in the 
local paper during the early years.  
There may have been little local resistance, but there was 
also little national attention or federal support, even though, 
increasingly, as the St. Louis plans began to unravel, it seemed 
likely that Ames would have the first full-scale implementation 
of the RDF technology. Ames was building the first municipally 
operated waste-to-energy plant, yet it did not qualify for a dem-
onstration grant because it was using technology from the St. 
Louis plant. While the EPA provided multi-million-dollar fund-
ing to the ten demonstration plants that would soon fail, the 
agency only gave Ames a $600,000 grant to buy degritting, dust 
collection, and sprinkler systems. The EPA also provided a 
$750,000 grant to the city, which distributed it to ISU to fund 
professors and students as well as the Ames Laboratory to 
study the “Ames Experience” for three years. The study in-
cluded environmental, technical, economic, and political aspects 
of the plant.26  
The city of El Cajon, California, was working on another 
type of resource recovery, a pyrolysis plant for which it had re-
ceived demonstration plant money. The disposal technique was 
quite different, but the size of the plant and the community it 
would serve were both similar to the Ames plant. Both cities 
were taking risks to provide trash service for the same number 
of people, so it did not seem fair, at least to the Ames Daily 
Tribune editorial board, that El Cajon was getting so much gov-
ernment assistance and attention. “It may be that El Cajon has a  
                                                 
25. Ames Daily Tribune, 11/2/1973. 
26. “Gibbs, Hill, Durham and Richardson Memorandum of Understanding 
dated May 10, 1977,” Minutes, Ames City Council, 11/11/1977; Engineering 
News Record, 9/5/1974, 13; S. Keith Adams, “The Economics of Solid Waste 
Resource Recovery — Analysis of the Ames System,” Proceedings of the Solid 
Waste to Energy Conference, 73. 
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The Ames plant’s relatively small size and its proximity to the power 
plant contributed to its success. From James J. O’Connor, The 1975 
Electric Utility Generation Planbook (New York, 1975), 37.
better publicity system than Ames,” the board wrote. “But so far 
little has been made of the efforts here. But it remains that on 
paper, the Ames operation is more impressive than the more-
publicized California plan.”27  
                                                 
27. John D. Parkhurst, Report on Status of Technology in the Recovery of Resources 
from Solid Wastes (Los Angeles, 1976), 123; Proceedings of the Solid Waste to En-
ergy Conference, v; Ames Daily Tribune, 1/30/1974, 1/8/1974. 
Ames Resource Recovery Plant      337 
JUST AS the Tribune had said, the Ames plant was impressive. 
Haulers entered a 30-foot-high room and dumped their trash on 
a tipping floor. A worker in a machine called a loader mixed the 
material, combining wet and dry trash at a ratio to encourage 
combustion of all the waste. The mixture was then put on a 
conveyor belt called a feeder and entered the primary shredder. 
At that stage the garbage was ripped to shreds by 48 130-pound 
hammers with a 1,000-horsepower motor. It then passed through 
the degritter, where small pieces of waste were captured by disc 
screens and the larger pieces continued on through the process. 
The degritted material, typically non-combustible, ended up in 
the landfill. The large items were put on an electromagnet con-
veyor, to remove 90 percent of the ferrous metals. The remaining 
waste then passed through a secondary shredder, where it was 
torn into two-inch pieces. At that point the material entered the 
air classification system, similar to St. Louis’s cyclone. As the 
waste went into the air classifier, the heavy materials fell to the 
bottom, while the lighter waste floated up in the air and was 
sucked into a pneumatic tube and carried to the RDF storage 
bin over at the nearby power plant. Conveyors then sent the 
material into one of two coal boilers, where it was cofired with 
coal at a ratio of about 70–80 percent coal to 30–20 percent RDF.28  
The plant could process up to 200 tons of waste per day. Its 
relatively small size was an asset. Larger utilities usually fired 
100 percent coal during their peak hours, reducing the amount 
to 30–40 percent at night. They bought the rest of their power 
from a pool, thus avoiding wasting fuel that was not needed. 
When cofiring coal with RDF, however, the off-time slackening 
could not occur because the flow of RDF to the boiler could 
not be reduced; the ratio of coal to waste had to be maintained 
evenly. An RDF system was, therefore, more expensive for lar-
ger utilities to adopt. Consequently, Ames became “the first and 
the big major contributor to [RDF] technology.” In May 1976 
Jerry Temple, the plant’s superintendent, informed U.S. Repre-
sentative Tom Harkin, “We feel we have a solution to a problem 
and hope more people will look into recovery and do it.”29  
                                                 
28. Doran, Energy from a Wasted Resource, 3–4, 13. 
29. Al Joensen, ISU professor of mechanical engineering, who studied the plant 
under the grant funded by the EPA, interview with author, 7/28/2009, Ames; 
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The Ames plant was not without its own problems, however. 
Inflation and unexpected costs caused the plant’s start-up cost to 
soar. Its final total cost was $6.3 million, nearly two-and-a-half 
times original estimates. Then, instead of dropping to 60 cents 
per ton or even producing a profit of over $2, as the city had 
ambitiously predicted in the early years, the plant’s disposal fee 
went through the roof. In 1977 the cost of disposal was $11 per 
ton, while the rest of Iowa was paying between $4 and $7 per ton 
for landfills. The town of Gilbert paid $8,000 per year to use the 
Ames facility, ten times the amount it would have cost to use the 
Boone County landfill 20 miles away. Story County communities 
that had signed 25-year contracts began to question their decision. 
When the power plant increased its rates, many people argued 
that the city should sell it to another utility provider and replace 
the costly resource recovery plant with a landfill.30   
Nearly all resource recovery plants across the country 
tended to cost more than expected because of mechanical or 
marketing problems, or a combination of both. Another issue 
was that people were not producing as much trash as cities had 
predicted. Landfills last longer when less trash is produced, but 
more trash allows resource recovery plants to lower their costs. 
The Ames plant had enough trash to fulfill its role in the co-
firing process, but resource recovery plants also made money 
from the separated resources that were sold to recycling com-
panies. Ames expected to receive nearly 55,000 tons of trash in 
1975. In its first three months of operation, the city shipped 542 
tons of ferrous metals, bringing in over $44,000; 120 tons of 
wood chips were sold for $15 per ton; and a relatively short-
lived motor oil container held up to 10,000 gallons of used oil, 
which was expected to sell for ten cents per gallon. When some  
Ames citizens complained that paper was just being wasted in 
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The American Pulverizer Company, which supplied parts for 
the Ames plant, advertised the city’s efforts in national maga-
zines. From American City & County, May 1978, p. 23. 
the recovery process, the city built a paper recycling annex next 
to the plant. The paper was sold for up to $40 per ton or burned 
depending on the economic markets.31  
The city’s willingness to seek markets for even seemingly 
worthless types of material demonstrated a true conservationist 
ethic. A plaque on the door of the plant, a reminder of its purpose, 
read, “Dedicated to the Reuse of our Resources and the Protec-
tion of our Environment.”32 Extracting recyclable materials was 
also an economic necessity. When lighter packaging and an eco-
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340      THE ANNALS OF IOWA 
nomic recession curbed consumerism and waste, the city’s ex-
pectations of waste generation fell short in 1977, decreasing to 
just 48,500 tons. The result was higher costs. Diminished or un-
reliable income on the material recovery side was another rea-
son the EPA began to favor the shift to the European mass burn 
technologies. By 1981, only 2 percent of the country’s MSW was 
being processed in resource recovery plants.33  
 
RESPONDING TO OBJECTIONS to the high cost of the plant, 
Ames Public Works Director Arnold Chantland, for whom the 
plant would later be named, stated, “We need to put some price 
on the value of land. This system doesn’t use up land as in land-
fills.”34 Once the energy crisis had passed, most other cities with 
resource recovery saw no other environmental good to justify 
their plants. Resource recovery did decrease the need for land-
fill space and risks of groundwater pollution, but environmen-
talists increasingly worried more about dangers from air pollu-
tion than land-related issues. While scarcity fears earlier in the 
decade had caused public discussion about farmland preserva-
tion, the only federal response was to promote more production 
through increased land use. During his visit to the Iowa State 
Fair in 1976, presidential candidate Jimmy Carter called farmers 
the “first and foremost environmentalists” and stated that “one 
of the greatest tragedies of the last eight years is the way the 
administration has cut back on farm conservation efforts. As a 
companion to building production and stable prices, we must 
also have conservation programs, to build back the land.”35
Some areas of Iowa, including Story County, were working 
on such programs. The county instituted farmland conservation 
measures during the decade to save what was “widely regarded 
as some of the most fertile corn land in the nation.” 36 In 1977 the 
county implemented a zoning plan based on a “corn suitability 
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rating.” Planners wanted to stop urban sprawl from eating up 
cropland, so they rated parcels of land on a scale of 1 to 100 
based on their conduciveness to growing corn. The county 
found that it could meet expected growth through the year 2000 
by only allowing the development of land that scored 62 or less 
on the scale, even though 93 percent of the county’s land scored 
higher than 62.37
Not everyone bought into the farmland conservation argu-
ments, including Earl King, the president of a rural power co-op 
called Allied Power, which in 1979 was trying to find a town in 
central Iowa willing to host its power plant. King said there was 
a “bit of phoniness” in the farmland preservation efforts. He 
pointed to ISU’s new football stadium, where, he said, “they 
play six home-games a year and they don’t even use it for prac-
tice. They park thousands of cars around there for 20 hours a 
year to watch a couple of teams play football.”38  
Many people, in fact, shared King’s skepticism. Many stud-
ies about the nation’s rapidly diminishing supplies of farmland 
had been released in the early 1970s, but, as geographer Michael 
Bunce points out, “Little evidence was produced to show that 
the overall level of agricultural output or the integrity of the ag-
ricultural economy was being seriously affected.” Bunce adds 
that farm problems in the 1980s were the result of “overproduc-
tion and global competition rather than land shortages.”39  
As with other environmental fears — overpopulation for in-
stance — the fact that the dire predictions did not come to fruition 
within a certain period of time did not mean people stopped 
being concerned. With these kinds of issues, if conditions did 
not worsen by a certain point, critics could always argue that 
society had been spared this time but trouble was still on the 
horizon if ways were not changed. Another possibility was to 
find new justifications for the same cause. That is what hap-
pened as Ames began to use farmland preservation as an argu-
ment for the resource recovery plant.  
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Bunce argues that the three main non-production justifica-
tions to preserve farmland were ecology, “local amenity protec-
tion,” and agrarianism. In addition to saying that its land was 
needed for corn production, the city of Ames relied on all three 
of the other justifications.  
The ecological position found its roots largely in the “land 
ethic” first espoused by conservationist Aldo Leopold, who ad-
vised people to “quit thinking about decent land-use as solely 
an economic problem. Examine each question in terms of what 
is ethically and esthetically right, as well as what is economi-
cally expedient. A thing is right when it tends to preserve the 
integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is 
wrong when it tends otherwise.” Many environmentalists had 
problems with modern agricultural practices, but turning farm-
land into a landfill for garbage would have been even worse 
for a “biotic community.” As Leopold said, “The less violent the 
man-made changes, the greater the probability of successful re-
adjustment in the pyramid.” (This was a kind of food-chain 
pyramid with soil on the bottom; on each layer above that 
rested species that relied on the layer below it for food.)40  
If local resources are considered a kind of amenity, then 
Ames’s second non-production justification for farmland pres-
ervation becomes clear. After a 1974 National Energy Task Force 
meeting in Washington, D.C., Juanita Vetter, chair of the Iowa 
League of Women Voters’ Board of Environmental Quality, re-
ported, “Iowa and Missouri were reproached for our reluctance 
to mine coal, in spite of its high sulfur content and its small 
pocket type deposits. We explained our concern for the good 
agricultural earth so vital to the food supply. The plains-
mountains representative chorused ‘we’re being raped so the 
rest of you can have energy. We’re going to look like the moon 
surface with nothing usable left!’”41 Iowa did not have oil or 
good coal. The best thing that Iowa could offer a country wor-
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ried about the future of its resources was farmland. Saving the 
land gave the state the ability to maximize its contribution to 
the nation.  
In the late 1970s, farmers, trying to emphasize the importance 
of the nation’s, and their own, global contributions, adopted the 
slogan “a bushel of wheat for a barrel of oil.”42 Agriculture did 
account for one-fifth of U.S. exports and offset 62 percent of the 
trade deficit caused by oil imports, but it could not compete toe 
to toe with oil.43 Plenty of other countries could supply oil ex-
porting nations with food, but not many other countries could 
supply oil to the United States. In addition, the United States 
was willing to pay almost anything for oil, as Assistant Secre-
tary of Agriculture Dale Hathaway noted in 1979, but “no one is 
willing to pay $20 for a bushel of corn.”44 Agriculture’s depend-
ence on oil, which had proliferated by the end of the decade, 
further weakened the argument that food should have the same 
standing as energy. By 1980, it took 1.13 barrels of oil to grow 
a ton of grain.45 Some economists and businesses argued that 
choosing between farm and energy interests should be based 
solely on which was more profitable. In a five-part series called 
“Vanishing Acres,” written for the Des Moines Register in July 
1979, reporter George Anthan quoted a USDA economist who 
opposed that idea: “According to that kind of reasoning,” An-
than said, “we should be taking land out of food production so 
we can save oil and natural gas. Then we could all sit down and 
eat oil and natural gas.”46  
That kind of thinking is a mix between the amenity idea and 
agrarianism. In some cases, converting farmland to other uses 
might have been a better economic choice. Some farmers, for 
example, might have been choosing to sell their land to devel-
opers. But in agricultural states such as Iowa, the idea that farm-
land was inherently valuable was a natural one, whether or not 
economic analyses or actual behavior supported that thinking. 
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It was an acceptable idea to many other Americans as well. 
Even though no food production shortage was in sight, a Louis 
Harris public opinion poll in 1980 showed that over half of all 
Americans surveyed considered the loss of good farmland to be 
a “serious problem.”47 City officials would use the inherently 
valuable status of farmland as a justification for its resource re-
covery plant over the next three decades.  
 
DURING THE 1980s the plant worked out many of the me-
chanical difficulties most other resource recovery plants across 
the country never survived to solve. The Ames plant also bene-
fited from its proximity to ISU with its strong engineering focus. 
Arnold Chantland started out as a city engineer and became the 
director of engineering services by the late 1960s, working for 
the city for 30 years. Well into his retirement he stated, “Engi-
neers believe in taking science and doing something useful with 
it. Hopefully, the public will accept it and think it’s useful.”48 
His pragmatic attitude was typical of engineers, who seek to 
apply knowledge to problems. The town’s mind-set, combined 
with an unusually high employee retention rate, allowed the 
Ames plant to build up a body of workers with the knowledge 
to anticipate trouble and, through much trial and error, to largely 
eliminate the flaws in the plant’s operating system.  
The last major mechanical difficulty of the decade occurred 
in 1987, when a propane tank exploded in the shredder. As plant 
superintendent John Pohlman recalled, the blast “took the wall 
off of the South side of the building, and almost blew it out onto 
Lincoln Way.” After that, the plant announced that it would 
take propane tanks for free, so that people would bring them in 
rather than attempt to hide them in their trash.49  
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The Ames plant operated in the red for over 20 years, some-
times costing four times the expected amount. Over that time, 
however, employees worked out the kinks in the plant. As a 
city spokesperson told the Tribune in 1995, during those years 
of deficit, the plant “saved nearly 800,000 tons of garbage from 
being deposited on more than 80 acres of farmland — enough 
rubbish to fill Hilton Coliseum 400 times.”50
While the Ames resource recovery plant chugged along, 
plans for the European-style waste-to-energy (WTE) plants 
looked promising for the rest of the country in the first half of 
the 1980s. That enthusiasm would not last more than a decade, 
though, and the number of plants peaked at 146 in 1996. Plans 
for 248 plants had been scrapped from 1982 to 1990, and by the 
end of the twentieth century there were only 109 plants left. 
WTE proponents had been optimistic about the 1978 Public 
Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), which guaranteed 
that alternative energy producers would get paid the same 
amount for their fuel as suppliers of traditional fossil fuels did. 
When fears of the energy crisis subsided in the 1980s, fossil fuel 
prices plummeted, and so did the revenue that WTE suppliers 
received.51 As the Ames plant was municipally owned, its exis-
tence did not depend on such profits. When the RDF was worth 
less, the city could just raise the fees it charged Story County 
citizens to use the plant.  
The second major cause of the WTE letdown in the 1980s 
was the 1986 Tax Reform Act. Under that law, cities had to pay 
taxes on bonds for projects that were not entirely publicly funded. 
That was a devastating blow to the WTE industry; the National 
Solid Waste Management Association said that taxing the bonds 
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was “really mandating a return to landfilling through tax pol-
icy.”52 Again, because Ames was entirely municipally owned, 
it was not affected. But even the Ames plant could not escape 
the third major blow to the push for WTE: a growing environ-
mental sensitivity, especially the increasingly prevalent belief 
that some high technology threatened environmental health.   
 
IN 1992, four years after the EPA had set a 25 percent recycling 
goal for the nation’s waste, Ames was considering whether or 
not to continue operating the resource recovery plant, which at 
the time was diverting 60 percent of Story County’s waste and 
82 percent of Ames’s from a landfill.53 The plant’s supporters 
related their opinions about recycling to the most controversial 
issue of that election year. In an Ames Daily Tribune story, Plant 
Superintendent Kenny Moravetz said that Ames was “pro-
choice” when it came to garbage. It was up to Ames residents 
whether they wanted to sort materials for recycling or just 
chuck it all. “In most communities,” Moravetz said, “you don’t 
have that choice. . . . We want residents to not feel guilty when 
they throw something away.” At least a few Ames environmen-
talists objected to the amount of materials recycled and to Mora-
vetz’s “pro-choice” statement. Ames resident Nancy Treu wrote 
a guest opinion for the Tribune calling the idea “absurd.” “It has 
been and is our selfish and wasteful overconsumption of re-
sources that has gotten us into this problem in the first place,” 
she wrote. “We SHOULD feel some guilt anytime we use up a 
resource, especially a non-renewable one.”54  
Specific worries about health aspects of the plant also began 
to arise. “I shudder every time I put a number six or seven plas-
tic container in my trash,” resident Peggy Murdock wrote. “I 
know we don’t recycle this grade of plastic because it is too 
hazardous for the people working in the plants that do that. 
Can it be any healthier for us to burn it six blocks from my 
home?” Murdock reversed her position after Merlin Hove, the 
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municipal electric system director, contacted her, but her letter 
showed that fears about air pollution were gaining ground on 
the farmland conservation issue, even in Ames.55  
In addition, the plant had yet to show any promise of ever 
turning a profit. At a community forum to discuss the MSW dis-
posal plans, some residents called the city “ignorant” for using 
the “incinerator.” Paul Wiegand, director of public works in the 
early 1990s, called the plant a “17-year experiment” and said 
that when Ames developed a new solid waste plan, recycling 
would probably be “the number one thing.”56  
The day after Wiegand’s statement appeared in the paper, 
R. W. Beck and Associates, the consultants the city hired to help 
create its next 20-year solid waste plan, appeared at the city 
council meeting to recommend that the city keep the plant but 
adopt a more integrated waste management system that in-
cluded some type of recycling. When the city council finally 
held a community forum to decide the plan, the debate focused 
exclusively on the resource recovery plant rather than recycling. 
Ultimately, recycling legislation would not happen in Ames. 
WTE plants operating before 1989 did not have to adhere to the 
EPA’s 25 percent recycling rule, and the city council decided 
against the shift on the basis of market demand. The council 
decided that paper and plastics, which made up 27 percent of 
the waste stream, were more valuable as fuel for the power 
plant than as recyclables. In addition, there was no need to 
regulate metals, because the current system already separated 
and recycled them. “Council members agreed that there was no 
point in subsidizing a recycling program when the city pays for 
the resource recovery plant.”57  
 
THE DEBATE over recycling versus burning did not occur in a 
vacuum. Pollution concerns about resource recovery plants had 
existed since the early 1970s. The early fears usually dealt with 
sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, or bacteria. Testing on Euro-
pean-style mass burn incinerator emissions at the end of the 
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decade, however, had revealed hazardous forms of dioxins, 
which were often created by plastics and chlorine. The plastics 
industry had boomed after World War II; by 1985, the United 
States was consuming 39 billion pounds of plastic per year. 
Unlike waste that was burned earlier in the century and often 
deemed a “nuisance,” plastic garbage when burned produced 
toxic chemicals, including dioxins.58 Although the evidence was 
“inconclusive,” problems believed to be associated with dioxins 
included “increases in cancer, birth defects, psychological dam-
age, liver damage, cardiovascular deterioration, and degenera-
tion of the endocrine system . . . disturbances in the responses 
of the peripheral nervous system . . . severe weight loss and 
chloracne, a disfiguring and persistent form of acne growth.”59  
The threat of dioxins was debated, as was the threat of the 
other air pollutants — including lead, mercury, beryllium, ni-
trogen oxides, polycyclic organic compounds, carbon monoxide, 
and hydrogen chloride — which many feared resource recovery 
plants were releasing. Many in the waste industry did not agree 
that the level of concentrations released carried such risks, but 
when a chemical plant in Italy had an explosion that released a 
“few pounds” of dioxin into the ambient air, leading to an area 
evacuation, to regular citizens “the extraordinary toxicity of di-
oxin was widely appreciated, if still poorly understood.”60
When area residents complained about the bad smells from 
the resource recovery plant in Hempstead, Long Island, the re-
cent concern about dioxin in European plants caused officials 
to test emissions. The Hempstead tests revealed “significant 
amounts” of dioxin in the plant’s emissions. According to bi-
ologist and environmental activist Barry Commoner, “An in-
tense controversy erupted, first among technicians about the 
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validity of the results, and later in the community about their 
significance.”61   
The controversy over the Hempstead plant gave citizens 
pause over existent plans for eight new WTE plants. The first 
was going to be built in the Brooklyn Naval Yard and was sup-
posed to process 3,500 tons of waste per day. Once worries over 
dioxins broke out, the plant became set on a long course of de-
railment thanks in large part to the efforts of Commoner. In a 
scene that would seem familiar 20 years later in Ames, a public 
relations battle over the Brooklyn plant ensued, with residents 
wanting to know how dangerous dioxins were and how much 
would be emitted. The Department of Sanitation (DOS) argued 
first that there was no risk of dioxins and later that the plant 
would burn the trash at such a high temperature that it would 
eliminate any dioxins in the garbage.62
Commoner, who began his career as an anti-nuclear scientist 
in St. Louis, now led the Center for the Biology of Natural Sys-
tems (CBNS) at Queens College. He and his crew became in-
volved in New York as scientific experts educating the commu-
nity about complex scientific issues. CBNS faculty attended 
public meetings about the WTE plants and provided test results 
from European plants that countered the DOS arguments. “It 
became clear,” Commoner later wrote, “that the public accep-
tance of the proposed incinerator would stand or fall on the ex-
pected effect of the dioxin emissions on the people exposed to 
them.” As he pointed out, these types of evaluations are particu-
larly difficult because they involve so many different kinds of 
science: chemistry, physics, physiology, biochemistry, and biology. 
The engineering firm that the DOS hired to measure the danger 
of dioxin levels found the risk to be an extra 0.13 deaths per mil-
lion people. The EPA’s acceptable risk level was one extra death 
per million people. CBNS immediately attacked the study for 
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assuming that the dioxins would be ingested by breathing, lead-
ing to a deceptively low risk level. The center conducted its own 
study and found the risk to be an extra 29 deaths per million, 
while an outside group estimated the risk at 5.9 per million.63  
CNBS’s most important assertion was that incineration cre-
ated dioxins. Dioxins did exist in products like plastics, as well 
as paper and PVC pipes, which used chlorine in production. 
WTE promoters argued and Commoner agreed that burning 
materials at certain temperatures could help eliminate dioxins. 
The problem, Commoner argued, was that the process of incin-
eration itself created new dioxins that did not originally exist in 
the materials. He said that dioxins were an emergent property 
of the process of incineration. WTE plants, which Commoner 
referred to exclusively as “incinerators” or worse, were another 
example, like nuclear power, of new technology creating new 
problems. Even if plants got better at controlling emissions, the 
anti-WTE groups argued that the dioxins present in the remain-
ing ash would be extra potent. Because the process “created di-
oxin,” it was inherently unsafe.64   
 While the national debate was brewing, back in Ames plant 
employees were emphasizing the recycling side of resource re-
covery. A subtitle on a Daily Tribune story titled “Talkin’ Trash: 
Ames Sets the Pace” read, “Recycling is a household word 
here.” The story stated, “As the recycling rage sweeps the na-
tion, Mid-Iowans can smile to themselves in the knowledge that 
they were ahead of their time.” The reporter brushed over the 
more controversial energy production side, writing, “Lest envi-
ronmental purists begin shouting that burning garbage cannot 
possibly be good for the environment . . . consider that the trash 
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The Garbage Monster, along with Reggie the Recycler (a cat), has endured 
as a mascot for the Ames plant. From The American City, June 1975, p. 162. 
provides enough energy to heat more than 4,600 homes each 
year.”65  
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Most Ames residents seemed to accept that argument and 
the plant. It is not surprising that burning unmarketable waste 
would be less controversial in a city with a high proportion of 
engineers. Environmental engineers generally accept that any 
type of environmental management will have some cost, an as-
sertion that may be less acceptable to the general public.  
Once it had decided to retain the plant, the city’s support 
did not waiver. It invested over $6.5 million in 1995 and 1996 
to replace worn equipment, add new technologies, and build a 
shredder room outside the main building to avoid future inci-
dents like the propane tank fire. Starting in 1996, the city even 
began counting the per capita fee it charged for trash service as 
revenue, allowing the plant to operate in the black for the first 
time in 1998.66 Soon, however, Ames would be directly con-
fronted with the dioxin controversy and its leading protagonist.  
In 2001 Barry Commoner and the North American Commis-
sion for Environmental Cooperation (NACEC) came out with a 
study on dioxins in North America. Commoner and the NACEC 
had been studying causes of cancer among the Inuit Indians who 
live in Canada’s Nunavut territory in the Arctic Circle. Although 
they are far removed from most industry, the Nunavut Inuit have 
an average of five to ten times the amount of dioxins in their 
bodies as other citizens of Canada and the United States. Using 
a computer-generated model, the NACEC determined that there 
were about 44,000 sources of dioxin emissions in Mexico, the 
United States, and Canada, and that due to weather patterns 
the Arnold O. Chantland Resource Recovery Plant in Ames was 
the very worst polluter, causing the most dioxins to move north 
and get trapped in the Arctic Circle. Dioxins do not usually reach 
the Arctic by air but instead get into water systems, where fish 
eat contaminated algae. The fish are ultimately consumed by ani-
mals with a high body fat content, like the seals that the Inuit rely 
on for subsistence, in which dioxins can accumulate.67
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ISU professor Robert C. Brown became the local authority to 
answer Commoner and his study. Brown had taught mechani-
cal, chemical, and biological engineering at ISU since 1983. He 
was a popular instructor who had gained notoriety because of 
his study of biofuels and was appointed director of the school’s 
Center for Sustainable Environmental Technologies in 1996.68 
The last time that the Ames plant’s stack emissions had been 
tested was in 1981. Although the test had come back negative 
for emissions, Brown said that result was based on old technol-
ogy and that any new test was certain to come back positive. 
At the time of Commoner’s criticism, the EPA did not have any 
standards for an RDF plant like the Ames one, so any determi-
nation about how many dioxins would be too much would 
have to be decided by a lay city council. Brown said that was a 
game that the council did not want to get into because it would 
be highly unlikely that the city would be able to satisfy the crit-
ics no matter how much money they spent. The city was going 
to ask the Kansas City firm Midwest Research Institute to test 
their equipment, a process expected to cost about $80,000. 
Brown, however, offered to do a study for just $5,000. The local 
scientist said the problem with paying for a more extensive test 
for the plant’s furnace and cooler was that even if the results 
came back satisfactory, Commoner could say that the dioxins 
must be coming from somewhere else in the facility.69  
This kind of debate among scientists is common for issues 
with subjective values but frustrating for the lay public. Political 
scientist Sylvia Noble Tesh has studied the issue and found that 
scientific proof about dioxins is often inconclusive, but emotions 
have often been powerful enough to change policies. She writes 
that “extrapolating [risks] from high to low doses . . . depends 
more on political judgment than on scientific data.” In the past, 
testing dioxins on animals (to the degree that was effective, 
which Tesh said it was not) did not provide any better scientific 
proof of the dangers of dioxins. As she states, “All the data on 
humans suggest that people can tolerate considerably higher 
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doses [than lab rats] before being harmed.”70 On the other hand, 
chemist Paul Connett, who worked with Commoner to stop the 
proliferation of incinerators in the 1980s, asserted that the scien-
tists cited by industry were “working for the industry,” while 
“most other scientists don’t know anything about it because they 
don’t have any incentive to study the issue. . . . So our biggest 
problem is not being attacked by fellow scientists, but rather not 
having fellow scientists with enough time, energy, commitment 
or motivation to find out who the hell is right.”71 No industry or 
profit motive was involved in the Ames resource recovery plant, 
but the relationship between Brown, the local researcher, and the 
city was too cozy for Commoner. 
Commoner and his crew said that the dioxins were a local 
danger as well as a problem for those in the nether regions of 
Canada. The danger, he said, was that the dioxins, which can 
cause cancer, got into food supplies and would build up in con-
sumers of the food. Any livestock being raised anywhere close 
to Ames — specifically, Wisconsin dairy cows — would carry on 
contaminants to consumers. Mark Cohen, the scientist who de-
veloped the computer model for the NACEC, said that within 
two weeks dioxins could have gone numerous different direc-
tions, “leaving North America ‘awash’” in them.72 Commoner’s 
two solutions were to speed up the cooling-off phase, so there 
would be less time for the dioxins to form, or to ban “incinera-
tors.” The plant’s long-standing argument had been that dioxins 
could not form in the 2,800-degree temperatures at which it 
burned its garbage.73
Before he began his study, Brown accepted Commoner’s 
counter to the plant’s argument: that dioxins could form in 
higher temperatures or at least in the cooling-off phases of re-
covery. He did not accept much else. In his report, Brown called 
Commoner’s conclusions “grossly inaccurate.” Commoner had 
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claimed that the Ames plant was producing 58 grams of dioxins 
per year; Brown said that number was 400 times too high. 
Commoner’s lumping of the power plant with “incinerators” 
particularly irked Brown, as the facility was a pulverized coal 
boiler. Only 20–30 percent of the burned material was garbage, 
and most metals were taken out before burning. In addition, 
plant proponents believed that cofiring with coal helped to re-
move toxins such as sulfur dioxide. Brown said that Commoner 
“found the worst type of combuster and used it [as a model] for 
Ames. . . . It was the absolute worst. . . . It in no way represents 
the facility in Ames.”74  
The exchange between the two scientists involved not only 
different ideas about methods but starkly different ideologies. 
Brown said that Commoner was advocating rather than doing 
science. Commoner, for his part, did not believe that the two ac-
tions were mutually exclusive. Historian Michael Egan has traced 
the entwined relationship between Commoner’s activism and his 
science. Commoner believed that scientists’ social responsibility 
was more important than the pursuit of science for its own sake. 
His entire career had been devoted to fighting against what he 
saw as technological overkill with inadequate knowledge of 
consequences.75 Brown, however, believed that Commoner’s 
activist platform caused him to create bad scientific analysis. He 
accused Commoner of having an answer he wanted to arrive at 
before he even began his research. Besides, Commoner had never 
studied the Ames plant in person but instead tried to figure out 
how much pollution the plant produced based on the type of 
equipment he believed the plant to have and the amount of 
waste the facility’s staff had said was being processed. That, 
Brown said, was “calculating on the basis of assumptions.”76 
Brown also pointed out that the only peer review that Com-
moner had for his findings was a review by his own staff. 
Commoner responded that his staff gave the paper “far more 
scrutiny than any peer-reviewed paper would normally get” 
and called Brown’s conclusions “distorted,” “puerile,” “un-
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ethical,” and “foolishness.” He said that Brown “did his job” by 
saving the city most of the $80,000 that an environmental test 
would have cost.77
Despite the rancor, there was no lasting conflict after the 
debate, and the city accepted Brown’s report as the final word 
on dioxin concerns.78 One reporter said that he remembered see-
ing Barry Commoner on the St. Louis Walk of Fame and sug-
gested that Ames should build its own Walk of Fame and “in-
clude Commoner, if only because he’s really given [the city] —
not to mention me — some interesting work to do.”79 An under-
ground opposition group called the Ames Quality of Life Net-
work was formed, but it apparently made very little effort to 
affect the council’s decision.80 A couple of months later a col-
umnist in a Nevada, Iowa, paper was lamenting the lack of a 
conservation ethic in her community. “I know [the city’s] trash 
goes over to the Resource Recovery Center in Ames to generate 
energy,” she wrote, “but I’m worried about the talk of dioxins at 
the plant. I recently read that babies get their lifetime supply of 
dioxins from six months of breast feeding.”81 The columnist 
no doubt expressed a sincere concern, but her words hardly 
sounded like they were coming from a community with highly 
mobilized protestors.  
 
TEN YEARS after the debate and 40 years after Ray Fisher first 
suggested it, the Arnold O. Chantland Resource Recovery Plant 
abides. It withstood the national death of resource recovery and 
the push to synfuel production and waste-to-energy plants. It 
survived shifts in federal policies, a propane explosion, two 
decades of debt, the recycling movement, and vociferous attacks 
by one of America’s most famous environmental activists. In 
2004 consultants suggested that the city close down the power 
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and resource recovery plants. Renovation costs for the power 
plant alone were estimated to be as much as $157 million.82 The 
plant survived again, however, as city officials decided for the 
time being to pay for improvements as necessary rather than 
abandon the facilities. The “small town with a pretty big idea” 
has used its savvy to advertise the plant to fit the changing 
times, but it also has become an anomaly by steadfastly clinging 
to its original environmental values: a pragmatic faith that tech-
nology can be used to solve environmental problems and the 
belief that the preservation of finite resources like land ought 
to be a priority. In the face of everything, the Ames plant has 
demonstrated what Donald Kaul said the country needed dur-
ing the alternative energy experiments of the 1970s: “Courage to 
carry out the old solutions.”83
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